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Introduction 
The basic problem for economic policy makers in LDC's in 
the 1980's, put simply, is to adapt their economies to survive 
and grow in the face of external shocks and internai 
pressures. External influences have been increasingly 
important over the last decade, and include oil price hikes, 
changes in terms of trade and technological innovation. The 
most obvious internai pressures are population growth and, in 
some cases, shortages of land and other rural resources. 
The objective for policy makers should be to restructure 
their economies, exploiting their dynamic comparative advantage 
to provide greater quantities of goods and services to their 
populations from a combination of both domestic and foreign 
sources. This has to be clone in such a way that basic needs 
continue to be met and the domestic resource base is not 
depleted. This is a difficult task and a more important one 
than ever before. In the 1960's and early 70's, policy makers 
tried to accelerate the rate of growth in their countries. 
Many countries in the eighties are simply trying to survive; 
they have to adjust as fast as they can just to keep from 
sliding back. 
At this point in time, it is fairly safe to draw a broad 
picture of what a healthy, dynamic economy looks like. It 
should be flexible in order to adapt quickly and smoothly to 
external shocks. It should embody a mutually complementary 
relationship between agriculture and industry, rather than an 
exploitative one. It should be open to technological 
innovation and reasonably open to market signais. 
These are relatively non-controversial observations, in 
part because they are so broad. A look at the experience of 
the S.E. Asian NIC's provides some more specific factors 
promoting successful economic performance and growth. Some of 
those are: 
the selective and facilitative role of the state in 
promoting industrialization, in contrast to the 
pattern of generalized protection found so often in 
Latin America or the phenomenon of industrial 
parastatals in Africa; 
the existence of an efficient bureaucracy to carry out 
that role; 
the implementation of land reform; 
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the existence or creation of appropriate rural 
institutions to transmit technology, inputs, credit 
and other services to small farmers and to harness 
their savings and investment potential. 
Research Problems for Policy Analysts 
The exact nature of the end state towards which any 
developing country should move will vary greatly from case to 
case, depending among other things on domestic resource 
endowments. One of the basic contentions of this paper, 
however, is that the broad general characteristics of a viable 
economy are fairly clear and that what isn't clear is being 
intensively researched by a great many individuals and 
agencies. The marginal return to IDRC's limited funds would 
not be greatest from research on where developing countries 
should be heading. The research frontier lies not in defining 
where weere going but in suggesting how we get there from 
here. Assuming that economies need to adapt and restructure, 
how should they do it? How can countries effect fundamental 
changes in their economies? 
On this subject, it is extremely difficult to find any 
research that will provide guidance. The IMF and the World 
Bank, the major international institutions prescribing policy 
reform, have little to say about this. For the most part, the 
IMF applies standard, simplified recipes; in part, it has to in 
order to be seen as treating each country impartially. For 
whatever reason, the IMF and World Bank recipes (e.g. the Berg 
Report) seem to me to be seriously flawed by what could be 
called the 'assumption of symmetry'.2 This is the notion that 
all one has to do to get an economy moving is to remove various 
market imperfections that have been erected over the last two 
decades. This is something like spinning a wheel in one 
direction, then suddently stopping it with a touch of a finger 
and spinning it in reverse. If I can mix metaphors, this 
always reminds me of the trick photography you sometimes see 
where a film is run in reverse. Objects fall from the floor to 
the ceiling; water runs uphill; a bullet pops out of the 
victim's heart, flies back into the gun and he (or the economy) 
springs back to life. 
The problem is that real world political economies don't 
function that way. Their wheels don't instantaneously spin 
backwards, because they have built in ratchets. Wages and some 
prices tend to be downwardly rigid, public sector employment 
expands in boom periods but is difficult to reduce in 
recessions, and economic distortions create excesss profits and 
privileged positions, the beneficiaries of which are very 
reluctant to give them up. A wide range of institutional and 
political factors, in short, impede rapid adjustment. 
The IMF and the Bank have taken some tentative steps in 
this direction. The IMF has done some research on sequencing 
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(e.g. in liberalizing an economy, should interest rates be 
adjusted before, after, or at the same time as exchange 
rates?). The Bank has set up a Policy Analysis unit, but so 
far its mandate is very limited. 
In view of the above, I suggest that the research frontier 
for economists lies in the investigation of how economic 
restructuring and policy reform can be effected. Policy 
analysts should be looking at the effects of change on specific 
income groups, at ways to minimize the costs of adjustment, at 
ways to com pensate the losers, at the optimal rate and 
sequencing of adjustment. Above all they should take into 
account the institutional and political factors which may block 
reform. They should not assume that changes in macro prices 
will automatically be transmitted to economic agents, but 
investigate in both a descriptive and a prescriptive sense the 
institutional channeis which mediate between prices and 
behaviour and which can serve a positive function in providing 
feedback to policy makers. 
The Role of Economic Analysis in Addressing the Research 
Problem 
I'll return to some of these research issues at more 
length later. At this point, I'd like to take a critical look 
at the discipline of economics and see how well suited it is to 
the research agenda I've briefly suggested. First, let me say 
that I think economic analysis can be a very powerful tool. In 
m y own admittedly biased view, economic logic has a rigour and 
a clarity that other social sciences disciplines sometimes 
lack. I think that economists have generally not put their 
tools to good use, however.3 
For one thing, they often apply their tools to problems 
only after they have made highly unrealistic or restrictive 
assumptions about the cases they are studying. The assumption 
that markets clear (that supply and demand will reach an 
equilibrium) entirely through price changes is more or less 
true in some markets and completely false in others. The 
labour market, for example, simply doesn't work this way. When 
unemployment goes up, we dont find people knocking on 
employers' doors offering their services for a dollar less than 
the going wage. If they do, we don't find employers accepting 
the offers. Institutional factors related to the effects of 
rapid turnover on motivation and on-the-job training lead to 
other means of clearing the labour market. 
For another thing, neo-classical economics is not a 
dialectical discipline; its basic tool for studying change is 
comparative statics. That is, it compares two static 
situations separated in time, rather than examining the process 
of change itself. Among other things, this makes it difficult 
to distinguish causality from correlation and makes it a weak 
tool for suggesting means by which change can effectively be 
implemented. 
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Third, the profession currently exhibits an extraordinary 
concern with theoretical purity and elegance. Increasingly, 
the principal criterion for evaluating a piece of economic 
analysis is its internai logical consistency rather than the 
degree to which it describes, explains or predicts real world 
behaviour. A recent survey of the articles published in the 
American Economic Review provides an illustration. The survey 
found that 93% of the articles contained no data; they sim ply 
manipulated algebraic variables in equations or sets of 
equations according to assumptions chosen by the author. 
Another 6% analyzed data taken from secondary sources such as 
Federal Trade Commission statistics. Only 1% of the articles 
presented new data. I suggest that this is not the best way to 
further our understanding of how economies work. 
Fourth, conventional economics is poor at dealing with 
such crucial factors as information, psychology and 
motivation. In order for economic analysis to work smoothly, 
the analyst must assume that everyone has perfect information 
(or the best information he can get) about prices and the 
availability of goods. He must also assume that individuals 
are motivated only by the desire to maximize profits or income 
and that goals such as meaningful work, human contact, and 
prestige are irrelevant. These are not realistic assum ptions 
and close off crucial areas for investigation. 
Fifth, the discipline is internally split along several 
dimensions. There are subdisciplines within a distinct pecking 
order (institutional, welfare and labour economics at the 
bottom, theoretical economics at the top). There is a gulf 
between macro and micro economists. And there are basic 
differences of opinion among the four major schools: 
neo-classical, Keynesian, monetarist and rational 
expectations. Some of these splits provoke fertile debates 
(such as that among the different schools of thought) but 
others, particularly the micro/macro split, are pernicious. 
Sixth, economists tend to ignore the fact that the market 
is only one institution among many in which exchange takes 
place and that it operates within an institutional framework of 
property rights defined by the state and society. The 
institutions which supplement the market and the overriding 
rules of the game are specific to individual societies. For 
this reason, economic laws cannot be universal and cannot be 
abstracted from the study of specific economies. 
Seventh, economists use their tools to look only at 
exchange that takes place within markets and not at the 
allocation of values by other institutions. In this sense, 
economics is both too modest and too brash. It refrains from 
investigating many aspects of human behaviour to which its 
tools could usefully be applied. At the same time, it pretends 
that the area it does explore is the universe and that economic 
policy can influence in a predictable fashion ail important 
aspects of behaviour. 
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These deficiencies have led to some spectacular failures 
on the part of economists to predict important trends and 
events. The most conspicuous is the collapse of the Phillips 
Curve, the theory that there is a trade off between inflation 
and unemployment. Attempts by monetarists and the rational 
expectations school to modify the Phillips Curve have not been 
persuasive and the phenomenon of stagflation has caused a 
crisis of confidence in economic theory as a guide to policy. 
The failure of conventional economics in developed countries is 
serious enough; the transfer of a research approach which 
avoids empiricai investigation to developing economies whose 
institutions are little-understood is even less promising. 
Alternative Approach 
In this section, I'll try to outline some alternative 
approaches to research on economic adaptation, ones which go 
beyond economic theory to provide a potentially more powerful 
analysis of the factors which promote and impede change. 
The approach I'm going to describe has been variously 
labeiled institutional economics, public choice, or political 
econany. It basically involves the examination by economists 
of non-market institutions which aliocate resources. It 
recognizes that individuals maximize more than income or 
profits and that institutions vary from country to country. 
These institutions allow individuals access to power, prestige, 
followers, networks, travel, and other values which may not be 
available through markets. It also studies the role of 
institutions, customs and laws in defining the rules of the 
game within which market transactions take place. It requires 
a precise and detailed knowledge of local cultures, structures 
and institutional environments. 
This method of analysis should supplement and not supplant 
conventional economic analysis. Changes in the environnent, a 
food price increase for example, will provoke three types of 
response, each requiring a different type of analysis. The 
first is a straightforward supply response. Ceteris paribus, 
there should be a tendency for production to increase as price 
increases. The second is an institutional response: if all 
food production is carried out by women but all receipts go to 
the men, the structure of decision making within the household 
will influence the supply response. Third is the political 
response: food consumers may protest and get the price 
increase rolled back. The point is that all three types of 
response must be anticipated if an effective reform of food 
price policy is to be implemented. 
The institutional analysis I'm proposing is of two types. 
The first is diagnostic and descriptive: the analysis of 
existing institutions and their effects on responses to policy 
or other sources of economic change. The second is positive 
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and prescriptive: the design of new institutions. As the 
S.E. Asian experience indicates, the existence of appropriate 
institutions to transmit price incentives and provide services 
to small farmers is an essential condition for rural 
d evelopment. 
The discussion of institutions to this point may have been 
somewhat abstract. I'11 try to make it more concrete by 
providing some exam pies of both types of institutional 
analysis. 
The clearest example of the first type from developed 
countries is the operation of the labour market as I described 
it earlier.4 Unemployed workers simply do not bid themselves 
into jobs. Why not? The answer seems to be that the 
continuous personnel turnover this would create would lower 
morale and productivity. Furthermore, it would give senior 
workers no incentive to train junior workers since, once 
trained, the juniors would underbid their trainers and put them 
out of work. On the job training would be impossible. The 
employer's practice of refusing bids from the unemployed is not 
irrational or a 'market imperfection'; it is an entirely 
rationai practice which enhances motivation and skills 
acquisition, two elements which conventional economics is poor 
at analyzing. Only recently have economists broadened their 
treatment of labour markets, looking at such phenomenon 
implicit contracts and internai markets. 
In developing countries, similar exam pies can be cited. 
Research has shown that peasant producers are influenced not 
only by how much they are offered for their goods but also by 
whom and in what circumstances. Norms and social relations can 
determine whether a good is exchanged or sold, or affect the 
interest rate on a loan. Individuals may acquire resources 
such as land at prices they cannot afford because ownership of 
those resources brings with it prestige, political power and 
claims on the labour of others, including family. Apparently 
perverse responses to shifts in price ratios may be entirely 
rational when the purchase of one factor of production actually 
increases access to the other. 
In understanding the logic of institutions, analysts must 
expand their definition of rationality. The structural reform 
of institutions like public enterprises or government 
ministries is often short circuited by the informai management 
system and pressures from outside.5 It is often in the 
interests of bureaucrats to maintain complicated procedures, 
red tape, departmentalism and so on in order to maintain 
control over information and preserve their power. A 
com plicated system gives old timers and skilled manipulators 
power over clients and an advantage over newcomers. 
Institutional reform must therefore penetrate the informal 
logic at work behind the formai structure and provide concrete 
and consistent incentives for actors to modify their 
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behaviour. A few economists have begun to develop an 'economic 
theory of bureaucracy', though so far it has been applied 
mainly to developed countries. 
At a more general level, it must be recognized that states 
plan their actions in accordance with a non-economic 
rationality that can supercede and impede economic efficiency. 
Marxists like Poulantzas contend that the state plays an 
autonomous role in resolving conflicts among dominant classes 
or within the dominant mode of production in order to preserve 
the capitalist system in the long run. It may, for example, 
apply price controls so that workers don't revoit; the result 
is a short term loss of profit for capitalists but a long term 
gain. Political rationality, in this view, reflects economic 
rationality and preserves economic efficiency. 
The public choice school differs in proposing that 
political rationality can override economic rationality and at 
the expenses of efficiency. Robert Bates6 has pointed out the 
phenomenon common to Africa whereby governments encourage 
agricultural production through projects (involving subsidized 
inputs to project participants) at the same time that they 
discourage production through adverse pricing policies. The 
public choice explanation is that project benefits can be 
targetted and thus provide a source of coercion, patronage and 
control. Price policies have generalized effects and offer 
fewer political advantages. The result has been the stagnation 
of African agriculture, an outcome which is economically 
inefficient. Governments themselves suffer as the size of the 
pie from which they take their tax slice shrinks. In the 
extreme case, the short run interests of a coalition of 
interest groups can become a log jam which, until broken, will 
send a country like Ghana into a prolonged downward spiral. 
Non-economic rationality can have either beneficial or 
harmful effects, depending on the case. The labour market 
exam ple is one in which extra-economic rationality leads to 
better worker motivation and transfer of skills. A variety of 
conventions and customs like the essentially voluntary obeyance 
of traffic laws is a similar example of a cooperative 
non-market solution to a problem. The African example I just 
cited is a pathological case. 
The second type of institutional analysis to which I 
referred is the search for alternative institutions to promote 
change and rural development. The use of local public finance 
to build schools and roads, or to pay for agricultural 
extension is a promising development which could relieve the 
financial burden on central governments and give local 
communities more control over the services they receive. The 
degree to which such institutions respond to the needs of the 
poorest, rather than to those of local elites, as well as the 
efficiency with which they discharge their responsibilities ail 
deserve investigation, however. New institutions which could 
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complement technological innovations, transmit incentives, 
motivate local'people, harness their savings and investment 
potential and provide feedback to central governments have a 
potentially enormous role to play in promoting rural 
development. 
This second type of analysis - the study of institutional 
innovation - is the one which our program has developed 
furthest. The most important area is that of rural resource 
management in Asia. Governments, communities and researchers 
are trying to devise ways of allocating property rights and 
managing the use of land, water and forests to permit equitable 
access by the poor and preserve the resource base. The work we 
have begun to support on contract farming tries to specify the 
appropriate conditions for a system which holds great promise 
in providing small farmers with price stabilization, technical 
assistance, and other services. The work on small scale 
fisheries and handicrafts also devotes some attention to 
alternative forms of organizing these industries to provide a 
greater share of benefits to the producers. 
The analysis of existing institutional and political 
constraints to change is much newer. Our major initiative in 
this area is a small network being planned for 1986. It will 
look at the process of economic restructuring in four S.E. 
Asian countries and attempt to suggest, not only policy 
measures, but also ways in which policy reform can be 
implemented. The researchers will model the effects of 
alternative policy instruments on various interest groups to 
see which instruments are most feasible politically. It may be 
possible to select instruments with equivalent objectives which 
have less severe, less sudden or less visible effects on vested 
interests. The costs and benefits for specific groups will be 
modelled and compensation schemes devised for the losers. 
A workshop and literature review of parallel markets in 
Africa is also being planned and will be partially financed by 
the next phase of the East Africa macro network. Farther down 
the rond, we are thinking about a workshop on Macroeconomics 
and Agriculture in Africa, in order to help close the rift I 
mentioned earlier (micro/macro). One of the problems of 
economic research in many countries, particularly in Africa, is 
that macroeconomists have their finger on many of the important 
problems but have no data and are unwi.lling to leave their 
offices to collect it. Agricultural economists are willing to 
dig up micro level data but often investigate problems of a 
relatively trivial or locality-specific nature for lack of an 
understanding of the macroeconomic policy environment within 
which agriculture is situated. The workshop will bring both 
groups together and sensitize them to the contributions 
possible from the other's approach. 
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Implications for IDRC's role, its relationship to the research 
community and its impact on public policy 
A basic question about this type of research, particularly 
on the political impediments to policy reform, is whether it is 
a legitimate field of support for IDRC. Are we or the 
researchers we support meddling in the politics of independent 
countries? To some extent, yes. It should be recognized, 
however, that ail economic policy research has this aspect. 
Any significant change in economic policy will affect a 
country's income distribution, whether the policy analysts 
responsible acknowledge it or not. Value judgements and an 
acceptance of the existing rules of the game underlie even the 
most technocratic recommendations. Furthermore, the apparently 
neutral recommendations made by powerful foreign advisors 
inevitably have a destabilizing effect; by refusing to take 
their analysis a step further and suggesting how policy reform 
can be implemented, they fail to restabilize the situation.? 
What are the implications of this approach for IDRC's 
relationship with the research community? The dichotomy 
between directiveness and responsiveness has been with us since 
IDRC began and is unlikely to ever be fully resolved. I 
believe the proposai I've outlined permits a reasonable balance 
between these conflicting objectives. What I've described is 
an approach to the study of development more than it is a 
specific set of problems. Researchers should continue to play 
the major role in defining research problems, since they are 
closest to the real world problems. IDRC, however, has the 
advantage of a comparative perspective and access to recent 
literature which researchers are often unaware of. Since IDRC 
staff work within an interdisciplinary environment and have the 
means to set up research networks, we are in a particularly 
good position to encourage comparative research on 
institutional questions. 
Is this type of research feasible in the political 
conditions of many developing countries? We won't know until 
we try. In the Philippines we've had quite a bit of success 
working in sensitive areas on sensitive topics. In other areas 
it might be different. Research on local public finance should 
not be too difficult. Research on political impediments to 
change might be tricky, but the very premise of the research 
indicates it should be possible. Institutional analysis 
indicates that governments and bureaucracies are not monolithic 
and that it may well be in someone's individual interest to 
divulge sensitive information. 
The question of the interest and training of researchers 
is also a serious one. The program I've described would be 
working on the research frontier, which is where I believe IDRC 
should be as much as possible. It will be difficult to work in 
this area, in part because developed countries have little 
intellectual technology to transfer - conventional economics as 
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taught in most North American universities doesn't have a lot 
to offer. On the other hand, developing country researchers 
should have a comparative advantage in this type of research 
because it doesn't require elaborate technical skills or 
theoretical training. Instead, the approach relies on 
sensitivity, common sense, and knowledge of local conditions. 
The local knowledge of local researchers and the comparative 
perspective made possible by IDRC networking should be a good 
combination. 
Finally, what is the potential policy impact of all this? 
On some subjects, local public finance, for example, it should 
be quite direct and immediate. Governments are looking quite 
hard for alternatives to centrally-financed services and the 
poor themselves can be users of the information generated. 
Research on how to implement policy reform should also be 
useful to some governments, more useful than ivory tower 
research that points out inefficiencies but doesn't say in 
politically realistic terms how they can be eliminated. 
Research of this type can also have policy impact at 
another level. It can generate ideas and public debate. 
Impact of a purely instrumental nature is not the only way that 
research can bring about change. History shows that ideas can 
be very powerful. Dependency theory had a tremendous influence 
on Latin American policy makers and led directly to the wave of 
import substitution that transformed the continent's economic 
structure in the fifties and sixties. The subsequent 
implementation of neo liberal policies had equally far reaching 
effects and was also strongly influenced by the intellectual 
currents of the day. In both cases, ideas took root in an 
environment and a time when policy makers were receptive to 
them. Developing countries have now acknowledged the need for 
structural adjustment and they have a broad picture of what 
their economies shold look like. They and powerful agencies 
like the IMF and the World Bank are poised on the research 
frontier, waiting for ideas about how the restructuring process 
can be implemented. It is time for our researchers to supply 
these ideas. 
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